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THE VIABILITY OF THE TRIMESTER APPROACH
The Supreme Court established in Roe v. Wade a trimester test
for determining the constitutionality of abortion regulations. In
developing this test the Court relied upon contemporary medical
knowled e. Because of recent advances in the medical field, it
was unclear whether the trimester approach was in concert with
these advances. This comment examines the development of the
Roe test, discusses the present controversy concerning these
medical advances, and analyzes three recent Supreme Court de-
cisions dealing with the issue.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Roe v. Wade,' the Supreme Court held that the fundamental
right of privacy inherent in the fourteenth amendment concept of per-
sonal liberty encompassed a woman's decision to terminate her preg-
nancy. The Court specifically stated that this right to privacy is not
absolute, however, but must give way to legitimate state interests when
these interests become compelling. Legitimate state interests include
the protection of maternal health, which becomes compelling at ap-
proximately the end of the first trimester, and the protection of poten-
tial life, which becomes compelling at fetal viability. Because advances
in medical technology have increased the safety of abortion techniques,
lower federal courts have differed as to the correct application of the
Roe test to regulations affecting second trimester abortions.'
In the recent decisions of City of Akron v. Akron Center for Repro-
ductive Health, Inc. ,' Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City,
Missouri, Inc. v. Ashcroft,4 and Simopoulos v. Virginia,5 the Supreme
Court, while recognizing these medical advances, expressly reaffirmed
the Roe test. This reaffirmation indicates that the Roe approach re-
mains a viable constitutional test, flexible enough to accommodate le-
gitimate state interests, personal liberties, and advancing medical
technology.
Although the focus of the controversy concerned regulations re-
quiring that all second trimester abortions be performed in a hospital,
6
the Supreme Court examined several other abortion regulations. This
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Compare Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. I11. 1978) (statute requiring all
post-first trimester abortions to be performed in a hospital is rationally related to
maternal health), affdsub nom. Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979) with
Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1980) (statute requiring post-
first trimester abortions to be performed in hospitals is not rationally related to the
protection of maternal health because it prohibits the safest alternative of post-
first trimester abortions in a clinic).
3. 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
4. 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983).
5. 103 S. Ct. 2532 (1983).
6. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481,
2496-97 (1983).
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comment discusses the application of Roe to regulations requiring the
informed consent of the patient, parental consent of minors seeking
abortions, mandatory waiting periods, second physicians at the abor-
tions of viable fetuses, disposal of fetal remains, and pathological re-
ports, as well as the requirement of hospitalization for second trimester
abortions. This analysis emphasizes the development of the Roe doc-
trine, the current division of the Court, and the validity and future ap-
plicability of Roe.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROE DOCTRINE
A. Pre- Roe v. Wade
The abortion dilemma is not a recent phenomenon.7 Until the
nineteenth century, the United States adopted the English common law
rule that abortions performed before quickening8 were not criminal of-
fenses, and those abortions performed after quickening were only mis-
demeanors.' In the last half of the nineteenth century, states began to
restrict their abortion statutes by making it a felony to commit an abor-
tion and by increasing the penalties."0 By the 1950's, many states had
banned abortions altogether unless necessary to save the life of the wo-
man."I A movement began in the 1960's to reform abortion regulations
so as to bring the law in line with the actual frequency of abortions. 2
7. See generally Special Project, Survey ofAborton Law, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 70 (dis-
cussing history of abortion law).
8. Quickening is the first motion of the fetus in the womb felt by the mother, occur-
ring usually about the middle of the term of pregnancy. BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 1122 (5th ed. 1979). The term was first used in this context by St. Thomas
Aquinas. Special Project, supra note 7, at 89 (citing A. PEGIS, BASIC WRITINGS OF
SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS 706 (1945)).
9. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 135-36 (1973); see Special Project, supra note 7, at 89
(citing 3 E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 50 (1644)).
10. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 139 (1973); see Special Project, supra note 7, at 100-06
(discussing American abortion law during the period 1860-1967); see also Lamb v.
State, 67 Md. 524, 10 A. 208 (1887) (interpreting 1868 Maryland law that pro-
scribed the sale of any medicine for the purpose of producing an abortion, or to
use or cause to be used any means whatsoever for that purpose).
11. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 139 (1973) (citing Comment,A Survey of the Present
Statutory and Case Law on Abortion." The Contradictions and Problems, 1972 U.
ILL. L.F. 177, 179); see MD. HEALTH GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-208 (Supp. 1983)
(statute allowing abortions only under the following conditions: pregnancy threat-
ens mother's life, physical, or mental health; substantial risk that child will be
permanently deformed or retarded; or the pregnancy has resulted from rape); see
also 62 Op. Ar'r GEN. 3 (1977) (Maryland statute is unconstitutional).
12. See Special Project, supra note 7, at 106-11. Included in the movement were the
drafters of the Model Penal Code, who proposed a less restrictive criminal abor-
tion statute; numerous organizations committed to social reform, such as the
American Civil Liberties Union; members of the medical profession who per-
formed "therapeutic" abortions despite statutes prohibiting this type of abortion;
and some organized religious groups. This movement favored liberalization of
abortion statutes to allow abortions necessary to save the life or health of the
woman, or when there was a likelihood of fetal abnormality, or when the preg-
nancy resulted from rape or incest. Id. at 109.
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In 1965, this movement was bolstered by the landmark decision of
Griswold v. Connecticut, 3 which established that the "penumbras" of
the Bill of Rights included a fundamental right of privacy that encom-
passed certain sexual and reproductive matters.' 4 In 1973,15 Jane Roe,
an unmarried pregnant woman, challenged a Texas criminal statute
that prohibited abortions unless medically necessary to save the life of
the mother.' 6 Citing a list of cases,' 7 including Griswold, the Court in
Roe v. Wade18 reaffirmed that the fundamental right of privacy is pro-
tected by the Constitution. The Roe Court stated that this privacy right
is founded in the fourteenth amendment concept of personal liberty,' 9
and "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to terminate
her pregnancy."2
B. Roe v. Wade2'
The Roe decision formulated the constitutional test for abortion
regulations.22 Although the Court reaffirmed the right of privacy, it
cautioned that the right is not absolute and must be balanced against
important state interests.23 Regulation of the right of privacy, like that
of other fundamental rights, must be justified by a compelling state
interest, 24 and must be narrowly drawn to further that interest.
25
13. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
14. Id at 485.
15. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124 (1973). Because of the social stigma associated
with women seeking abortion, some suits were brought anonymously with the use
of pseudonyms.
16. Id at 117 n. 1. The Texas statute made it a crime, punishable by two to five years
imprisonment, to cause an abortion unless medically necessary to save the life of
the mother. TEx. STAT. ANN. art. 1191 (Vernon 1925).
17. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (contraception protected by right of personal privacy); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage is a matter of personal privacy); Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (family relationships are protected by personal privacy);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (the right of personal privacy extends
to sexual matters); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (child rearing
protected by personal privacy); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (law
prohibiting the teaching of a foreign language in school invaded liberty guaran-
teed by the fourteenth amendment)).
18. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
19. Id at 153. The Roe Court stated that the right may also be found in the ninth
amendment's reservation of rights to the people. Id.
20. Id
21. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
22. See L.D. WARDLE, THE ABORTION PRIVACY DOCTRINE (1980).
23. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
24. Id at 155 (citing Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969)
(right to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (right of interstate
movement); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (freedom of religion)).
'25. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)).
Although the Roe Court stated in its summary of its holding that the restriction
must be tailored to meet the recognized state interest, Roe, 410 U.S. at 165, courts
have relied on the language on page 155 and have required that the regulation be
narrowly tailored to the state interest. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 413 (1981);
[Vol. 13
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There are two valid state interests in abortion regulations: protect-
ing maternal health and preserving potential life.26 These interests are
separate and distinct, and each becomes more substantial as the preg-
nancy progresses. 27 The interest in protecting maternal health becomes
compelling at approximately the end of the first trimester of preg-
nancy.28 The Court selected this point because, until that stage of the
pregnancy, mortality rates for women undergoing abortions were less
than the mortality rates for women carrying full-term.29 By contrast,
the interest in preserving potential life becomes compelling at the point
of fetal viability.30 Concluding that a fetus is not a person for four-
teenth amendment purposes,3 ' the Roe Court selected viability as the
point when this interest becomes compelling because the fetus "pre-
sumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's
womb."32
Roe left the states free to regulate abortion provided that the regu-
lation did not significantly burden the fundamental right of privacy
without furthering a compelling state interest. During the first trimes-
ter, or before the state's interests become compelling, the decision to
abort rests entirely with the pregnant woman and her physician.33 Any
regulation may be reasonable when justified by important state health
objectives, such as requiring abortions to be performed by licensed
physicians.34 At approximately the end of the first trimester, when the
state interest in protecting maternal health becomes compelling, the
state may promote this interest by regulating the abortion decision in
Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 777 (7th Cir. 1980); Frieman v. Ashcroft, 584 F.2d
247, 251 (8th Cir. 1978), afl'dmem., 440 U.S. 941 (1979); Wynn v. Scott, 499 F.
Supp. 1302, 1307 (N.D. I11. 1978), af'd sub nom. Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193
(7th Cir. 1979).
26. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159, 162-63.
27. Id at 162-63.
28. Id at 163.
29. Id
30. Id Viability is the point when, as determined by the physician, there is a reason-
able likelihood that the fetus will survive outside the womb with or without artifi-
cial aid. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 388 (1979).
31. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158.
32. Id at 163. The Roe definition of viability differs from that of Colautti. See supra
note 30. The Colautti definition includes the possibility of life with artificial aid.
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 388 (1979).
33. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
34. Id at 150, 164-65; see Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975) (per curiam)
(statute forbidding abortions performed by any person is constitutional as applied
to non-physicians). The Meniio Court remarked: "The insufficiency of the state's
interest in maternal health is predicated upon the first trimester abortion's being
safe ... and that predicate holds true only if the abortion is performed by medi-
cally competent personnel under conditions insuring maximum safety." Id at 11;
see also State v. Ingel, 18 Md. App. 514, 519, 308 A.2d 223, 226 (1973) (statute
requiring abortions to be performed by licensed physicians is constitutional);
Lashley v. State, 10 Md. App. 136, 142-43, 268 A.2d 502, 506 (1970) (although it
dismissed action for lack of standing, court concluded it was within police power
of the state to proscribe abortions not performed by qualified physicians).
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ways that are reasonably related to protecting maternal health." When
the fetus becomes viable, the state may promote its interest in preserv-
ing potential life by proscribing abortions except when medical judg-
ment indicates that an abortion is necessary to preserve the life or
health of the pregnant woman.36 The Roe Court cautioned the states
that any regulation must be tailored to further legitimate state inter-
ests,37 and those regulations that unduly burden a fundamental right
will be subjected to strict scrutiny analysis.
38
The Roe test was applied in the companion case of Doe v. Bol-
ton. 3  In Doe, the Court invalidated a statute that required all abor-
tions to be performed in an accredited hospital because the state failed
to prove that only hospitals further the state interest in protecting the
quality of the operation and the health of the patient.40 Therefore, the
regulation was not reasonably related4' to the protection of maternal
health. The Court did not prohibit state regulation in this area; states
may adopt licensing requirements for facilities that provide abortions
after the end of the first trimester provided these regulations are legiti-
mately related to a state objective.42
C. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth
43
The Supreme Court first examined a statute affecting second tri-
mester abortions in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Dan-
forth .4 The Danforth Court invalidated a statute prohibiting the use
of saline amniocentesis45 for abortions performed after the first trimes-
ter. The United States District Court for the District of Missouri had
upheld the statute as reasonably related to protecting maternal health
35. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
36. Id at 164-65.
37. Id at 165; see supra note 25 (some courts have interpreted Roe to require "nar-
rowly tailored").
38. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Bauza v.
Morales Carrion, 578 F.2d 447 (1st Cir. 1978); Bell v. Hongisto, 501 F.2d 346 (9th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975); Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473
F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973).
39. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
40. Id at 195. In addition, the statute violated Roe since it applied to all stages of
pregnancy. See also Arnold v. Sendak, 416 F. Supp. 22, 24 (S.D. Ind.) (discussing
hospital requirements of Roe and Doe), aff'd mem., 429 U.S. 968 (1976).
41. Doe, 410 U.S. at 194. "It is a requirement that simply is not 'based on differences
that are reasonably related to the purposes of the Act in which it is found.'" Id
(citing Morey v. Dodd, 354 U.S. 457, 465 (1957)).
42. Doe, 410 U.S. at 195.
43. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
44. Id
45. This method requires injecting saline into the amniotic sac of the woman to in-
duce labor. "While it generally results in fetal death, it has been associated with
harmful side effects in women and doctors have increasingly turned to the use of
prostaglandin in late abortions." Kleiman, When Abortion Becomes Birth." A Di-
lemma of Medical Ethics Shaken by New Advances, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1984, at
BI, col. 1.
[Vol. 13
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based on evidence that alternative procedures were safer for women.'
In reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court called attention to sev-
eral factors ignored by the district court. The lower court failed to rec-
ognize that most second trimester abortions used the saline
amniocentesis method 47 and that alternative methods, although safer,
were not readily available.48 In addition, the statute prohibited the use
of "saline or other fluid(s)," and therefore prohibited the use of the
most common alternative methods. 49 The Supreme Court noted the
inconsistency that would have resulted had the statute been upheld:
the state prohibited the use of saline amniocentesis to protect maternal
health, yet allowed the use of techniques far more hazardous to the
health of the pregnant woman.50
The Roe, Doe, and Danforth decisions indicate that courts must
carefully examine a regulation justified by the interest in protecting
maternal health. Danforth demonstrates that this examination must in-
clude the availability of alternatives allowed by the regulation. Doe"'
and Danforth52 establish that a regulation meets the Roe requirements
for post-first trimester abortions when, after an examination of all the
evidence and alternatives, the regulation protects women from proce-
dures more dangerous than childbirth and preserves access to safe
abortion procedures.53 Fulfilling these conditions also satisfies the Roe
requirement that the regulation reasonably relate to the protection of
maternal health and be specifically tailored to further that interest.
D. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.54
The Supreme Court expressly reaffirmed Roe in City of Akron V.
Akron Centerfor Reproductive Health, Inc.," where the Court refined
and clarified the constitutional test to be applied to regulations affect-
ing second trimester abortions. The Court adhered to Roe's determina-
tion that the beginning of the second trimester is the approximate time
when the state's interest in protecting maternal health becomes compel-
ling.56 TheAkron Court explained that the determinative question for
judging a regulation affecting second trimester abortions is "whether
there is a reasonable medical basis for the regulation."57 The state is
46. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1374 (E.D. Mo. 1975), rev'd, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
47. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 77.
48. Id
49. Id at 77-78.
50. Id at 78.
51. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
52. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52.
53. See Note, Hospitalization Requirement for Second Trimester Abortions.: For the
Purpose of Health or Hindrance?, 71 GEO. L.J. 991, 1000 (1983) (analyzing Roe,
Doe, and Danforth).
54. 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
55. Id at 2487.




not allowed to regulate these abortions in a manner that departs from
accepted medical practice.58 The Roe Court compared mortality rates
for women undergoing abortions and women carrying to full-term to
determine when the interest in protecting maternal health becomes
compelling.59 TheAkron Court maintained that this comparison is rel-
evant only when the state uses the maternal health rationale to prohibit
completely abortions in certain circumstances, such as the ban on abor-
tions by saline amniocentesis in Danforth.60 The saline amniocentesis
method was "safer, with respect to maternal mortality, than even con-
tinuation of the pregnancy until normal childbirth."'"
Concerning second trimester abortions, the Akron Court noted
that Roe did not hold that it is always reasonable to adopt a regulation
that affects the entire second trimester.62 Rather, Roe held that the
state must tailor the regulation to meet the compelling state interest at
the time that interest will be furthered.63 As the Akron Court ex-
plained, "[tlhe State is obligated to make a reasonable effort to limit the
effect of its regulation to the period in the trimester during which its
health interest will be furthered."'
Thus, Akron did not alter the Roe test. Approximately after the
end of the first trimester, according to Roe, states are free to regulate in
a manner reasonably related to the protection of maternal health.65 Ak-
ron interpreted this to require that the regulation not depart from ac-
cepted medical practice.66
The development of the Roe doctrine indicates that the Court has
consistently required the states to meet a demanding test to justify a
regulation affecting post-first trimester abortions. Although Roe used
the phrase "reasonably relate" to describe the nexus between the state
interest and the regulation, decisions such as Danforth and Akron re-
quire a stronger relationship.67
III. APPLICATION OF THE ROE DOCTRINE
A. Informed Consent Provisions
One of the five regulations at issue inAkron required the attending
physician to inform the patient of the status of her pregnancy prior to
58. Id at 2493.
59. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
60. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2492 n.l 1 (citing Danforth, 428 U.S. at 78-79).
61. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2492 n.ll.
62. Id at 2495.
63. Id
64. Id
65. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
66. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2493.
67. See Note, supra note 53 (analyzing second trimester abortion regulations).
[Vol. 13
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the abortion procedure.68 Danforth69 upheld the requirement that a
woman give her informed consent before undergoing an abortion be-
cause the requirement does not unduly burden her right of privacy and
is justified by legitimate state health objectives.7 ° The regulation in
Danforth required a woman to certify, in writing, that her consent to a
first trimester abortion is "informed and freely given and is not the
result of coercion."'" The Danforth Court found no constitutional de-
fect in requiring informed consent only for certain procedures, such as
abortion, because this kind of statute would be upheld if applied to any
surgical procedure.7 2 Lower courts have held that the requirement of
informed consent must not interfere with the medical judgment of the
physician.7 3 Many courts analyzing this issue have interpreted Dan-
forth to require that all relevant medical knowledge be disclosed and
all moral and philosophical statements be avoided because they may
interfere with the physician-patient relationship.74 A few courts sup-
68. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2489 n.5. An abortion could not proceed until the attending
physician informed the patient:
(2) [The] number of weeks elapsed from the probable time of
conception ....
(3) That the unborn child is a human life from the moment of concep-
tion and that there has been described in detail the anatomical and phys-
iological characteristics of the particular unborn child . . . including,
but not limited to, appearance, mobility, tactile sensitivity, including
pain, perception or response, brain and heart function, the presence of
internal organs and the presence of external members.
(4) That her unborn child may be viable, and thus capable of surviving
outside of her womb ....
(5) That the abortion is a major surgical procedure, which can result in
serious complications, including hemorrhage, perforated uterus, infec-
tion, menstrual disturbances, sterility and miscarriage and prematurity
in subsequent pregnancies; and that abortion may leave essentially unaf-
fected or may worsen any existing psychological problems she may have,
and can result in severe emotional disturbances.
AKRON CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 1870.06(b)(2)-(5) (1978), noted in Akron, 103 S.
Ct. at 2489 n.5.
69. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
70. Id at 65-67. Contra Women's Services P.C. v. Thone, 636 F.2d 206, 210 (8th Cir.
1980) (regulation requiring woman to be informed of reasonably possible medical
and mental consequences is unduly burdensome and not justified by state
interests).
71. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 65.
72. Id at 67.
73. Frieman v. Ashcroft, 584 F.2d 247, 251 (8th Cir. 1978) (regulation invades "deli-
cate and private" physician-patient relationship), afdmem., 440 U.S. 941 (1979);
Women's Medical Center of Providence, Inc. v. Roberts, 530 F. Supp. 1136, 1151
(D.R.I. 1982) (regulation burdens physician-patient relationship); Margaret S. v.
Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 209 (E.D. La. 1980) (regulation impedes physician's
right and ability to practice medicine freely).
74. Women's Services P.C. v. Thone, 636 F.2d 206, 210 (8th Cir. 1980); Charles v.
Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 784 (7th Cir. 1980); Birth Control Centers, Inc. v. Reizen,
508 F. Supp. 1366, 1377 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Leigh v. Olson, 497 F. Supp. 1340,
1345 (D.N.D. 1980); Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1316-17 (N.D. Ill. 1978),
ajfd sub nom. Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979); see Wolfe v. Schroer-
ported the proposition that the information required by statute to be
related to the patient must vary with the individual and the stage of
pregnancy,7 5 and that the information can be adequately related to the
patient by someone other than the attending physician.76
TheAkron ordinance required the attending physician to delineate
to the patient the development of the fetus, the date of possible viabil-
ity, the physical and emotional consequences of an abortion, the risks
associated with the pregnancy and the abortion technique to be used,
and the availability of agencies to provide information about and
assistance with birth control, childbirth, and adoption.77 The Court
stated that the validity of the informed consent regulation depended
upon the state's interest in protecting maternal health," and it is pri-
marily the physician's role to determine what information the patient
needs before consenting to the procedure.79 There is a difference be-
tween requiring that the patient be informed, as recognized and sup-
ported by Danforth, and mandating that specific information be
communicated to the patient. Therefore, although a state may consti-
tutionally require that a woman's consent be informed, this rationale
will not allow a regulation detailing specific factual information
designed to influence a woman's decision.8" The Akron Court found
the ordinance unconstitutional because it unduly burdened the physi-
cian-patient relationship by interfering with the physician's medical
judgment and discretion.8 In addition, the ordinance impermissibly
extended the state's interest in ensuring informed consent by providing
information designed to persuade a woman not to abort, 82 thereby in-
terfering with a physician's independence of judgment relied upon by a
woman when making her abortion decision.
8 3
The Akron Court also found no legitimate state interest requiring
the attending physician to inform the patient.84 Since the state's inter-
est is in ensuring that the woman be informed before she consents to an
abortion, any qualified person, regardless of identity, may counsel the
woman.85 The state may, however, legitimately require a physician to
verify that adequate counseling has been given, and that the consent is
informed. 86 The state may also require reasonable minimum qualifica-
ing, 541 F.2d 523, 526 (6th Cir. 1976) (statute allowing physician to inform wo-
man of reasonably possible physical and mental consequences is constitutional).
75. Frieman v. Ashcroft, 584 F.2d 247, 251 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'dmem., 440 U.S. 941
(1979); Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 208-09 (E.D. La. 1980).
76. Women's Medical Center of Providence, Inc. v. Roberts, 530 F. Supp. 1136, 1147-
49 (D.R.I. 1982).
77. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2489 n.5; see supra note 68.
78. Id at 2499-500.
79. Id at 2500.
80. Id
81. Id at 2501.
82. Id. at 2500.
83. Id. at 2501 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 n.33 (1977)).
84. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2502.
85. Id
86. Id
330 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 13
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tions for abortion counselors.8 7
B. Parental Consent Requirements
In addition to the informed consent provisions, the Akron ordi-
nance also prohibited physicians from performing an abortion on an
unmarried minor under age fifteen unless the physician obtained the
consent of one of the minor's parents, or unless the minor obtained a
court order that the abortion be performed.88
Danforth was the first Supreme Court case to analyze the issue of
third party consent to an abortion. The Danforth Court held that the
state lacked constitutional authority to give a third party absolute veto
power over the decision to abort.89 The state argued that its interest in
safeguarding the family unit and parental authority justified the re-
quirement of parental consent before the abortion could proceed. 90
The Court disagreed, holding that any parental interest is "no more
weighty than the right of privacy of the competent minor,"91 and since
there was no valid state interest justifying the requirements, the consent
provision was unconstitutional.92
Subsequently, in Bellotti v. Baird,9 3 the Court noted that the con-
87. Id at 2502-503.
88. Id at 2488 n.4. The ordinance provided:
(B) No physician shall perform or induce an abortion upon a minor
pregnant woman under the age of (15) years without first having ob-
tained the informed written consent of the minor pregnant woman ...
and
(1) First having obtained the informed written consent of one of her par-
ents or her legal guardian. . .. or
(2) The minor pregnant woman having obtained an order from a court
having jurisdiction over her that the abortion be performed or induced.
AKRON CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 1870.05(B)(1)-(2) (1978), noted in Akron, 103 S.
Ct. at 2488 n.4. The provisions requiring 24 hour actual notice or 72 hours con-
structive notice to the parents of an unmarried pregnant minor under the age of 18
were upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 651 F.2d 1198, 1206 (6th
Cir. 1981), and were not challenged in the Supreme Court. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at
2497 n.29.
89. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976); see also Poe
v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 794 (5th Cir. 1975) (none of the asserted justifications
for parental consent requirement met the Roe standard); Leigh v. Olson, 497 F.
Supp. 1340, 1349 (D.N.D. 1980) (requirement of parental notification regardless
of minor's maturity unduly burdens minor's privacy right); Wynn v. Scott, 449 F.
Supp. 1302, 1317 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (provision unconstitutional because substan-
tially similar to parental consent requirement in Danforth), affd sub nom. Wynn
v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick,
401 F. Supp. 554, 567 (1975) (requirement destroys fundamental right of compe-
tent minors; when best interests of parent and child conflict, the state cannot man-
date that the parents always prevail).
90. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75.
91. Id
92. Id
93. 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion) (BellottiII). In Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S.
132 (1976) (Bellotti I), the Court did not decide the constitutionality of the statute,
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stitutional rights of children could not be equated with those of adults
for three reasons: not all children are able to make informed, compe-
tent decisions; children are peculiarly vulnerable; and the parental role
is important in child rearing.94 Although judicial deference to parents
may be permissible with respect to other choices facing a minor, the
uniqueness of the abortion decision makes it inappropriate to give a
third party possible veto power.95 Consequently, if a state mandates
parental consent, it must also provide an alternative statutory proce-
dure whereby a minor can judicially establish either her competency to
make the decision to abort, or that the abortion is nevertheless in her
best interests.96
The fault with the Akron ordinance was that it did not expressly
provide for the alternative procedure recommended by Bellotti 1.J97
The Court noted that the City of Akron could not determine that all
minors under fifteen are too immature to make this decision, or that the
abortion may never be in the minor's best interests without parental
approval.98 The city argued that the state juvenile court qualified as a
court having jurisdiction over the minor within the meaning of the or-
dinance, and that presumably the juvenile court would adhere to recog-
nized constitutional principles.99 Therefore, the city urged that Court
to abstain from deciding this issue until it was fully resolved in the
state."D The Court refused, noting that the Akron ordinance created
no procedures for making the necessary determinations, and that the
ordinance did not specifically refer to the state juvenile court.' 0 '
Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc. v.
holding instead that "abstention is appropriate when an unconstrued state statute
is susceptible of a construction by the state judiciary" that might avoid the consti-
tutional issues. Id. at 146-47. On remand, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts held that as a general rule, a minor may not seek judicial consent to an
abortion without first obtaining the consent of both parents. The United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts held this interpretation unconsti-
tutional, and the state appealed to the Supreme Court in Bellotti II.
94. Bellotti 11, 443 U.S. at 634.
95. Id. at 643; see also In re Cindy Lou Smith, 16 Md. App. 209, 224, 295 A.2d 238,
245 (1972) (when the General Assembly enacted a state law (MD. ANN. CODE art.
43, § 135 (1957) that allowed a minor to have the same capacity as an adult to
consent to treatment for pregnancy, the legislature did not intend to allow the
parent(s) to have the power to compel a minor to have an abortion. A minor in
these circumstances is emancipated from her parents. This statute was recodified
verbatim in MD. HEALTH GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-102 (1982)).
96. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 643-44. See generally Green, Parents, Judges and a Minor's
Abortion Decision: Third Party Participation and the Education of a JudicialAlter-
native, 17 AKRON L. REV. 87 (1983) (discussing parental consent requirements).
97. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2498-99.
98. Id at 2498 (citing Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74
(1976)).
99. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2498.
100. Id
101. Id at 2498-99.
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Ashcroft1o2 also involved a statute that required minors to secure either
parental or judicial consent for an abortion.'o3 TheAshcroft Court up-
held the statute on its face because it allowed the juvenile court, after a
showing of good cause, to either grant the juvenile majority rights to
consent to the abortion or to allow the abortion to proceed because of
the best interests of the minor. The juvenile court could also deny the
minor's petition for good cause; therefore, the court could not deny a
petition for good cause unless it first found that the minor was not suffi-
ciently mature to make her own decision. Because the statute expressly
provided for a judicial decision maker and a procedure to determine
competency, the Court upheld this statute as in accord with Bellotti and
Akron.'04
C. Mandatory Waiting Period Requirements
Another important issue involved in the abortion controversy is
whether a mandatory waiting period is constitutionally permissible.
The City of Akron attempted to impose a mandatory twenty-four hour
waiting period before an abortion could be performed.0 5 Federal
courts that had previously analyzed this issue agreed that these waiting
periods are unduly burdensome on the fundamental right of privacy. 06
The district court in Akron upheld the ordinance because it furthered
the state interest in ensuring informed consent. 07 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding no medical ba-
sis for the ordinance and that the ordinance exceeded the scope of state
102. 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983).
103. Id at 2525-26. The statute provided:
(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause:
(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting
to an abortion; or
(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the minor and give
judicial consent to the abortion, setting forth the grounds for so finding;
or
(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on which the petition is
denied.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028.2 (4)(a)-(c) (Vernon 1982).
104. 4shcroft, 103 S. Ct. at 2525-26.
105. The 24 hour period elapsed between the time of the consent and the time of the
operation. Id. at 2489 n.6. The ordinance does not apply if the physician certifies
in writing that there is an emergency need for the abortion. AKRON CODIFIED
ORDINANCES § 1870.12 (1978), notedin City of Akron v. Akron Center for Repro-
ductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2503 n.42 (1983).
106. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1015
(1st Cir. 1981); Women's Services P.C. v. Thone, 636 F.2d 206, 210 (8th Cir. 1980);
Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 780 (7th Cir. 1980); Women's Medical Center of
Providence, Inc. v. Roberts, 530 F. Supp. 1136, 1147 (D.R.I. 1982); Wolfe v.
Stumbo, 519 F. Supp. 22, 26 (W.D. Ky. 1980); Leigh v. Olson, 497 F. Supp. 1340,
1347-48 (D.N.D. 1980). But see Wolfe v. Schroering, 541 F.2d 523, 526 (6th Cir.
1976) (24 hour waiting period constitutional).
107. Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172, 1204-05 (N.D. Ohio 1979), rev'd, 651 F.2d 1198 (6th
Cir. 1981), af'd, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
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authority.° 8 The Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's finding' 9
and, moreover, found no legitimate state interest was furthered by this
"arbitrary and inflexible" waiting period." 0
D. Disposal of Fetal Remains
The Akron Court also examined the portion of the ordinance that
required physicians to ensure the humane and sanitary disposal of fetal
remains." ' I The city contended that the ordinance was designed to pre-
vent "mindless dumping of aborted fetuses.""' 2 Although the Court
acknowledged that the language could be interpreted to suggest a "de-
cent burial" of the fetus,' ' it found the ordinance unconstitutional be-
cause it failed to give fair warning to a physician of the type of conduct
proscribed by the ordinance. 14 In particular, the term "humane" was
held unconstitutionally vague. 115
E Second Physician Requirements
Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc. v.
Ashcroft" 6 involved a Missouri statute requiring the attendance of a
second physician at the abortion of a viable fetus. " 7 The second physi-
cian was required to use reasonable measures to preserve the life and
health of a fetus provided it did not pose an increased risk to the life or
health of the mother."' The Court previously invalidated a regulation
108. Akron, 651 F.2d 1198, 1208 (6th Cir. 1981), rev'g 479 F. Supp. 1172 (N.D. Ohio
1979).
109. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2503, affig 651 F.2d 1198 (6th Cir. 1981).
110. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2503. The Court found no evidence that the waiting period
enhanced the safety of the abortion, or that it contributed to acquiring informed
consent. Id at 2503-04.
111. The statute provided: "Any physician who shall perform or induce an abortion
upon a pregnant woman shall insure that the remains of the unborn child are
disposed of in a humane and sanitary manner." AKRON CODIFIED ORDINANCES
§ 1870.16 (1978), noted in Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2489 n.7.
112. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2504.
113. Id
114. Id.
115. Id. The Court affirmed the decision by the court of appeals to invalidate the
whole regulation rather than sever the word "humane." Id
116. 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983).
117. Id. at 2521. The state statute provided:
An abortion of a viable unborn child shall be performed or induced only
when there is in attendance a physician other than the physician per-
forming or adducing [sic] the abortion who shall take control of and
provide immediate medical care for a child born as result of the abor-
tion. During the performance of the abortion, the physician performing
it, and subsequent to the abortion, the physician required. . . to be in
attendance shall take all reasonable steps in keeping with good medical
practice, consistent with the procedure used, to preserve the life and
health of the viable unborn child; provided that it does not pose an in-
creased risk to the life or health of the woman.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.030.3 (Supp. 1982).
118. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. at 2521.
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in Doe v. Bolton" 9 that required two physicians to agree with the at-
tending physician prior to performing an abortion. 20 The Doe Court
could not find a "justifiable pertinence" behind the statute.' 2 ' In addi-
tion, the Court in Doe found the statute unduly restrictive of the pa-
tient's rights.'22
Subsequent lower federal court decisions have been inconsistent
on this issue. For example, one federal district court held that a regula-
tion requiring the attending physician to consult with two other physi-
cians for post-viability abortions was unconstitutional because it was
not narrowly drawn to further legitimate state interests. 23 Another
federal district court, however, upheld this type of regulation because
the approval of the other two physicians would help further the legiti-
mate state interest in preserving potential life. 124 In so doing, this court
interpreted Roe to allow more latitude in regulating post-viability
abortions.
25
The Supreme Court upheld the second physician requirement in
Ashcroft on the basis that since abortions of viable fetuses are allowed
only when the mother's life or health is in jeopardy, the first physician
must necessarily concentrate on protecting maternal health. The sec-
ond physician, because of his duty to use reasonable means to protect
the viable fetus, is in a better position than the first physician to ensure
that the state's interest in protecting potential life is furthered. As a
result, the Court concluded that this statute reasonably furthered a
compelling state interest in protecting potential life. 1
26
The four Justices 27 who found the second physician requirement
unconstitutional reasoned that the statute related to protecting poten-
tial life only when the physician used a technique that results in a live
birth. 128 Although the state requires the physician performing a post-
119. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
120. Id at 198.
121. Id at 197-98.
122. Id
123. Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1320 (N.D. I11. 1978), arffd sub nom. Wynn v.
Carey, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979).
124. Doe v. Deschamps, 461 F. Supp. 682, 688 (D. Mont. 1976).
125. Id
126. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. at 2522.
127. Id at 2526 (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall & Stevens, JJ., dissenting in part) (sec-
ond physician requirement unconstitutional). The Ashcroft majority consisted of
the members of the Akron dissent (O'Connor, White & Rehnquist, JJ., dissent-
ing), and the remaining Justices (Burger, C.J., & Powell, J.). Although Justices
Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens agreed with the constitutional test ap-
plied in Ashcroff, they disagreed with the result. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. at 2527
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (Justices joined that part of
the majority opinion accepting Akron). In contrast, the Akron dissent upheld the
regulations in Ashcroft not because they agreed with the test applied, but because
they agreed with the result. Id at 2532 (O'Connor, White & Rehnquist, JJ.,
dissenting).
128. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. at 2529-31 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part).
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viability abortion to use a method to preserve potential life, this re-
quirement does not apply when that method would impose increased
risks to maternal health. The dilation and evacuation (D&E) technique
precludes a live birth, and may be necessary to preserve the life and
health of the woman. 29 In this case, the second physician's presence
would be superfluous since no viable fetus can survive a D&E proce-
dure. These Justices stated that because of instances such as this, the
statute unduly burdens the woman's rights, and is not tailored to fur-
ther state interests.'3 ° These Justices also maintained that the statute
makes no clear exception for emergency operations. 13
F Pathology Reports
The Ashcroft Court upheld a second statute that required a pathol-
ogy report for tissue removed during an abortion. 3 2 The Court held
that the small additional cost of the report was not unduly burden-
some, 13 3 and noted that the regulation was in accordance with accepted
medical practice because a similar requirement existed for most other
types of surgery performed in hospitals. 134 The majority stated that it
was not unreasonable to apply this statute to abortions performed in
clinics as well.' 35 The dissent'36 inAshcroft maintained that the small
additional cost was unduly burdensome 137 and that the requirement
conflicts with current medical standards, which allow a cursory exami-
nation of the tissue by the naked eye of the attending physician.138 In
addition, the dissent found that the statute was not justified by any im-
portant state health interests. 39 The dissent further noted that a simi-
lar requirement was not imposed for other minor surgery performed in
clinics. 140
G. Hospitalization Requirements
A significant portion of the Akron opinion involved an ordinance
129. Kleiman, supra note 45.
130. 4shcroft, 103 S. Ct. at 2530 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part).
131. Id at 2529-31.
132. Id. at 2519 n.2. The Missouri statute provided:
A representative sample of tissue removed at the time of the abortion
shall be submitted to a board eligible or certified pathologist, who shall
file a copy of the tissue report with the state division of health, and who
shall provide a copy of the report to the abortion facility or hospital in
which the abortion was performed or induced and the pathologist's re-
port shall be made a part of the patient's permanent record.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.047 (Supp. 1982).
133. 4shcroft, 103 S. Ct. at 2524.
134. Id at 2523.
135. Id
136. Id at 2528 (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall & Stevens, JJ., dissenting in part).
137. Id
138. Id. at 2527.
139. Id
140. Id. at 2528.
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that required all abortions after the first trimester be performed in a
hospital. 14  In Roe, the Court stated that hospitalization requirements
are one type of permissible post-first trimester abortion regulation.
42
Some courts have interpreted this language to mean that these require-
ments are always reasonably related to maternal health."43 Roe's state-
ment, however, was qualified by the Court's holding in Doe. '44 In Doe,
the statute required that all abortions be performed in hospitals. ' 45 The
Court invalidated this statute, noting that the state failed to prove that
only hospitals meet the acknowledged state interest in ensuring the
quality of the operation. 
46
Other courts applying Roe, Doe, and Danforth have held that
when there is considerable evidence that facilities other than hospitals
can perform abortions with little risk to maternal health, a statute is
unconstitutional if it requires that post-first trimester abortions be per-
formed only in hospitals. 147 The Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld,
as reasonably related to maternal health, a regulation that allowed li-
censed outpatient clinics to perform safe abortions during the second
trimester, and that required all other abortions to be performed in a
141. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2488 n.3. The Akron statute provided that "[n]o person shall
perform or induce an abortion upon a pregnant woman subsequent to the end of
the first trimester of her pregnancy, unless such abortion is performed in a hospi-
tal." AKRON CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 1870.03 (1978), noted in Akron, 103 S. Ct.
at 2488 n.3. In turn, the statute defines "hospital" as "a general hospital or special
hospital devoted to gynecology or obstetrics which is accredited by the Joint Com-
mission on Accreditation of Hospitals or by the American Osteopathic Associa-
tion." AKRON CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 1870.1(B) (1978), noted in Akron, 103 S.
Ct. at 2488 n.3.
142. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
143. Hodgson v. Lawson, 542 F.2d 1350, 1354 (8th Cir. 1976); Gary-Northwest Ind.
Women's Servs. v. Bowen, 496 F. Supp. 894, 902 (N.D. Ind. 1980), affd sub nom.
Gary-Northwest Ind. Women's Servs. v. Orr, 451 U.S. 934 (1981); Wynn v. Scott,
449 F. Supp. 1302, 1318 (N.D. Ill. 1978), a ff'dsub nom. Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d
193 (7th Cir. 1979).
144. See Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2494-95.
145. Doe, 410 U.S. at 184.
146. ld at 195. The Court held that the statute was invalid because it did not differen-
tiate between first and post-first trimester abortions in accordance with Roe. Id;
see Smith v. Bentley, 493 F. Supp. 916, 928-29 (E.D. Ark. 1980) (invalidating
statute similar to one in Doe); Emma G. v. Edwards, 434 F. Supp. 1048, 1051
(E.D. La. 1977) (invalidating statute requiring first trimester abortions be per-
formed in a hospital); Arnold v. Sendak, 416 F. Supp. 22, 24 (S.D. Ind.) (invali-
dating statute requiring first trimester abortions be performed in licensed
hospital), aff'dmem., 429 U.S. 968 (1976). Maryland subsequently invalidated a
portion of MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 139 (1957), which required that all abortions
be performed in an accredited hospital. State v. Ingel, 18 Md. App. 514, 520, 308
A.2d 223, 226 (1973).
147. Wolfe v. Stumbo, 519 F. Supp. 22, 24-25 (W.D. Ky. 1980) (noting that the D&E
abortion method is one of the safest and most available procedures that can be
performed in non-hospital settings); Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181,




Under the ordinance in Akron, all post-first trimester abortions
must be performed in a hospital.'49 In finding this requirement uncon-
stitutional, the Court noted that Roe did not hold that it is always rea-
sonable to adopt a regulation that affects the entire second trimester. 150
Instead, the Akron Court interpreted Roe to mean that the state must
narrowly tailor its statute so as to "limit the effect of its regulations to
the period in the trimester during which its health interest will be
furthered." 5'
The Court invalidated the ordinance for two reasons. The re-
quirement involved an additional cost to women, depending upon the
proximity of the woman to a hospital, and it limited their ability to
obtain an abortion.'52 In addition, present medical knowledge indi-
cates that the D&E procedure is a widely and successfully used method
of second trimester abortions, 153 and can be performed safely in appro-
priate non-hospital facilities. The Court found that these factors placed
a "heavy and unnecessary" burden on the woman's decision to obtain a
second trimester abortion. 54 The City of Akron did not meet its bur-
den of proving that all second trimester abortions must be performed in
hospitals to protect maternal health, and the Court found this require-
ment unreasonable. 155 For the same reasons, the Court invalidated a
similar regulation in Ashcroft. 
15 6
In Simopoulos v. Virginia,'57 the only issue before the Court was
the validity of a state statute requiring that all second trimester abor-
tions be performed in a licensed hospital.' 58 The notable difference be-
148. Livingston v. New Jersey State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 168 N.J. Super. 259,
402 A.2d 967 (1979).
149. For the text of this ordinance, see supra note 141.
150. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2495.
151. Id
152. Id at 2496.
153. Id ; see Wolfe v. Stumbo, 519 F. Supp. 22, 24-25 (W.D. Ky. 1980) (D&E is one of
the safest and most available procedures that can be performed in non-hospital
facilities); Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 195-96 (E.D. La. 1980) (not-
ing that the safety of D&E abortions has increased since Roe).
154. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2497.
155. Id The regulation was comparable to that in Danforth because it would preclude
access to the safest and most available abortion technique. Planned Parenthood
of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 78 (1976); see Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488
F. Supp. 181, 193 (E.D. La. 1980) (Louisiana regulation restricting post-first tri-
mester abortions to hospitals was comparable to regulation in Danforth prohibit-
ing use of saline amniocentesis).
156. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. at 2520.
157. 103 S. Ct. 2532 (1983).
158. Simopoulos v. Virginia, 103 S. Ct. 2532, 2536 (1983). Performing abortions is a
felony in Virginia unless: (1) performed within the first trimester; (2) performed
in a licensed hospital in the second trimester; (3) performed during the third tri-
mester under certain circumstances; or (4) is necessary to save the woman's life.
See VA. CODE § 18.2-71 to -74.1 (1982), noted in Simopoulos, 103 S. Ct. at 2535
n.2.
338 [Vol. 13
Viability of Trimester Approach
tween this regulation and the one invalidated in Akron is that the
Virginia statutory definition of "hospital" included outpatient hospitals
such as abortion clinics. 9 Applying Akron, the Court stated that a
state's discretion in licensing facilities would not permit it to adopt
abortion regulations that depart from accepted medical practice, but it
could establish minimum standards for abortion facilities. 60 Since re-
quiring that second trimester abortions be performed in a licensed fa-
cility is a reasonable means for the state to further its compelling
interest in protecting maternal health, the Court upheld the statute.1
6 1
IV. ANALYSIS
4. Division on the Court
A basic disagreement exists on the Court as to the appropriate
constitutional test to apply to abortion regulations. Five of the Justices
on the Akron Court were members of the 1973 Roe majority, 62 and
again supported the proposition that the fundamental right of privacy
includes the right to decide to have an abortion. Justice Stevens, who
joined the Court in 1975, sided with these five Justices to form the Ak-
ron majority. The original Roe dissenters, 63 however, increased their
ranks by one with the addition of the newest member of the Court,
Justice O'Connor."6 Justice O'Connor drafted the strong Akron dis-
sent, which questioned the existence of a "fundamental right to termi-
nate a pregnancy."'
' 65
All members of the Court agree that when a fundamental right is
involved, the initial inquiry is whether the regulation unduly burdens
that right. The present test, supported by a majority of the Court, re-
quires a statute that unduly burdens the fundamental right of privacy
involved in the abortion decision be analyzed with strict scrutiny. The
unduly burdensome regulation can only be justified by a compelling
state interest, and it must be reasonably related to the compelling inter-
est involved. In the abortion context, the compelling state interests are
the protection of maternal health, which becomes compelling at the ap-
159. Simopoulos, 103 S. Ct. at 2538-39. The statute provided:
'Hospital' means any facility in which the primary function is the provi-
sion of diagnosis, of treatment, and of medical and nursing services, sur-
gical or nonsurgical, for two or more nonrelated individuals, including
hospitals known by varying nomenclature or designation such as sanato-
riums, sanitariums and general, acute, short-term, long-term, outpatient
and maternity hospitals.
VA. CODE. § 32.1-123.1 (1982), noted in Simopoulos, 103 S. Ct. at 2536 n.5.
160. Simopoulos, 103 S. Ct. at 2539.
161. Virginia has since lessened its regulation of abortion clinics. See Virginia to Ease
Regulations on Abortion Clinics, Washington Post, Nov. 18, 1983, B3, col. 6.
162. Chief Justice Burger, Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Powell. Justices
Douglas and Stewart constituted the remainder of the Roe majority.
163. Justices Rehnquist and White.
164. Justice O'Connor replaced Justice Stewart in 1981.
165. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2508 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
19841
Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 13
proximate end of the first trimester, and the protection of potential life,
which becomes compelling at viability. In addition, the regulation
must be narrowly tailored to effect the compelling interest. The regula-
tion is narrowly tailored when its effect is limited to the period of the
pregnancy when the compelling interest is furthered. When protecting
maternal health is the compelling interest, the regulation cannot depart
from accepted medical standards. If the regulation does not unduly
burden a fundamental right, strict scrutiny analysis does not apply, and
the regulation need only rationally relate to a legitimate state interest.
The Akron dissent stops short of expressly indicating a desire to
overrule Roe, but instead adopts an approach that would achieve this
result.' 66 The dissent is unlikely to find any regulation unduly burden-
some, as evidenced by its determination that none of the regulations in
Akron ,167 Ashcroft, 168 or Simopou/os 169 was unduly burdensome. 70
The Akron dissent diverges from the present test on the issue of com-
pelling state interests. Both the majority and the dissent agree that the
compelling state interests in the abortion context are the protection of
maternal health and the preservation of potential life.' 7 ' The present
position of the Court is that neither of these interests is compelling
before the approximate end of the first trimester, at which time the in-
terest in protecting maternal health becomes compelling, and that the
interest in preserving potential life becomes compelling at viability. By
contrast, the dissent maintains that both of these interests are compel-
ling throughout pregnancy."'
This divisiveness indicates that a majority of the Court is more
166. SeeAkron, 103 S. Ct. at 2481 n.l (majority opinion demonstrates howAkron dis-
sent's approach negates Roe).
167. Akron, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
168. Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. 2517
(1983).
169. Simopoulos v. Virginia, 103 S. Ct. 2532 (1983).
170. For example, the Akron majority found informed consent provisions unduly bur-
densome because they interfere with the woman's right to decide to have an abor-
tion. See supra notes 68-87 and accompanying text. The dissent would hold this
regulation not unduly burdensome. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2515 (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting). Although the Akron majority also found the second physician require-
ment in Ashcroft unduly burdensome, they split as to whether the regulation was
reasonably related to a compelling state interest. CompareAshcroft, 103 S. Ct. at
2522 (regulation reasonably related to compelling state interest) with id at 2530
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (regulation not tailored to compelling interest). The
members of the Akron dissent did not find this requirement unduly burdensome.
Id at 2532 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
The dissenting Justices in Akron joined with two members of the Akron ma-
jority to hold that the pathology requirement in Ashcroft was not unduly burden-
some. Id at 2532. The Akron majority concluded that the second trimester
hospitalization requirement was a "significant obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion." Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2495. The dissent maintained that the
regulation was not unduly burdensome. Id at 2512. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
171. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2508 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
172. Id
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concerned with individual rights while the dissent is more supportive of
state rights. The majority, which would apply a strict scrutiny analysis
more often than the dissent, requires the state to show a compelling
interest, that the regulation reasonably relates to that interest and does
not depart from accepted medical practice, and that the effect of its
regulation is limited to the period of the pregnancy when its interest is
furthered. The majority requires the state to make this showing before
it restricts individual freedoms. In those instances where the dissent
would apply a strict scrutiny analysis, the state need only show that the
regulation is reasonably related to compelling state interests that are
present throughout pregnancy. The dissent practically eliminates the
requirement that the regulation be limited in its effect because under
the dissent's test, the state may regulate abortions throughout the entire
pregnancy.
B. Viability of the Roe Framework
A majority of the Court is committed to the soundness of the Roe
analytical framework and to the principles underlying the Roe opinion.
The three recent decisions of Akron,'I" Ashcroft, 74 and Simopoulos 175
indicate that this framework is sufficiently flexible to accommodate
changes in medical technology that result in the increased safety of
abortion techniques.
Presently, after the approximate end of the first trimester, the state
may regulate only to further its compelling interest in protecting mater-
nal health, and the regulation must be narrowly tailored to further this
interest. Accordingly, the state's abortion regulations may not depart
from accepted medical practice. The recent decisions emphasize that
the regulation must be specifically tailored because Roe did not hold
that it is always reasonable for a state to adopt a regulation that applies
to the entire second trimester. Instead, as Akron demonstrates, the
state has to prove that its regulation reasonably relates to protecting
maternal health throughout the entire second trimester.176 If a regula-
tion departs from accepted medical practice for part of the second tri-
mester, it is not constitutional merely because it is reasonable for the
remainder of the second trimester. As a consequence, the state must
limit the effect of the regulation to the period of the trimester when the
maternal health interest will be furthered by the regulation. This is
consistent with the Roe requirement that the regulation be narrowly
tailored to further the compelling state interest. The hospitalization re-
173. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481
(1983).
174. Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. 2517
(1983).
175. Simopoulos v. Virginia, 103 S. Ct. 2532 (1983).
176. See supra notes 54-69 and accompanying text.
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quirements in Akron 1' and Ashcroft' 7 8 failed to meet this test, while
the statute in Simopoulos '79 reasonably furthered a compelling state in-
terest throughout the second trimester.
The dissent in Akron claimed that the majority's approach "blurs
the bright lines" of the Roe framework, 80 and therefore the state can-
not consider the second trimester as one unit and regulate second tri-
mester abortions on the basis of the risks posed by all procedures.'
8'
This contention is misplaced because the majority did not alter any of
the points at which the state interests become compelling. Instead, the
Akron majority indicated that depending upon the abortion methods
used and present medical knowledge, risks to maternal health will vary,
and the state's regulation must be narrowly and specifically drawn to
meet this interest. The state may consider the second trimester as a
unit, but its regulation must further maternal health by addressing
these various risks throughout the second trimester.
The dissent also contended that the majority abandoned Roe's
comparison of mortality rates for women who undergo abortion and
those who proceed to childbirth as a test for whether a regulation is
reasonably related to protecting maternal health. 82 The Roe Court
only used this comparison to fix a point in time when the state's interest
in protecting maternal health becomes compelling because the state's
interest in maternal health cannot become compelling until abortion
procedures pose a risk to maternal health.'83 Accordingly, had the Ak-
ron majority relied on this comparison it would have indicated a will-
ingness to move the compelling point and thus "blur the bright lines"
of Roe, which the Court expressly did not do.'
84
177. Akron, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983) (invalidating an ordinance requiring all post-first
trimester abortions to be performed in a hospital as not narrowly tailored to fur-
ther compelling governmental interest in protecting maternal health).
178. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983) (invalidating a hospitalization requirement sub-
stantially equivalent to the one invalidated in Akron, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983)).
179. Simopoulos, 103 S. Ct. 2532 (1983) (upholding a statute requiring all post-first
trimester abortions to be performed in hospitals when the statutory definition of
hospital included out-patient clinics, and therefore the regulation was reasonably
related to protecting maternal health).
180. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2506 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
181. Id
182. Id at 2505 n.2.
183. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
184. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2494; see Margaret S. v. Edwards, 418 F. Supp. 181, 195-96
(E.D La. 1980) (court moved the point when the interest in protecting maternal
health becomes compelling); see also Gary-Northwest Ind. Women's Servs. v.
Bowen, 496 F. Supp. 894 (N.D. Ind. 1980), which stated:
If the constitutionality of the regulation depended on whether, as a mat-
ter of fact, an abortion was more dangerous than childbirth, then it must
be remembered that each individual pregnancy raises its own set of facts.
The safety of a given abortion, the safety of a given childbirth, and the
relative safety of an abortion vis a vis [sic] childbirth in a given preg-
nancy, all depend on a multitude of medical factors which vary with
each and every pregnancy. Such a rule would have the potential of mak-
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The Akron dissent argued that the Court has become an ex officio
medical board with the power to approve or disapprove medical proce-
dures." 5 This contention lacks merit since the Court has merely at-
tempted to ensure that the state does not infringe upon constitutional
rights by restricting access to those medical procedures.
C. Future Applicability of Roe
The Akron dissent maintained that the majority blurred Roe's
bright lines by advancing the point when the state's interest in protect-
ing maternal health becomes compelling. 6 Referring to inevitable ad-
vances in medical technology, the dissent asserted that abortions will
increasingly pose less threat to maternal health, while at the same time
the point of viability will move closer to conception.'87 Therefore, "the
Roe framework is on a collision course with itself."'88 The Akron ma-
jority did not, however, move any of the compelling points, 189 and the
Roe test was carefully formulated to avoid this result. o
Roe allows abortions of viable fetuses when, in appropriate medi-
cal judgment, it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the wo-
man.'9 ° The Court has never analyzed the issue of whether the
physician's duty to the woman outweighs his duty to a viable fetus, i.e.,
whether a physician is allowed to make a trade-off between protecting
maternal health and preserving potential life. The Court has held that
should these circumstances arise, the state must meet a strict require-
ment of precision in its regulation before it may hold the physician
criminally liable.19' Therefore, any decision resolving this conflict will
most likely be left to the physician because the determination of viabil-
ing the constitutionality of each specific application of a regulation de-
pend to a large degree on the factors present in that specific case. If the
Supreme Court had intended that complicated medical judgment be de-
cisive on whether specific regulations were reasonably related to mater-
nal health, then the Supreme Court would surely have instead adopted
the more rational rule that the abortion's effectuation must be left to the
medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician.
Id at 900, a]J'd sub nom. Gary-Northwest Ind. Women's Servs. v. Orr, 451 U.S.
934 (1981).
185. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2506-07 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see Livingston v. New
Jersey Bd. of Medical Examiners, 168 N.J. Super. 259, 402 A.2d 967 (1979) (board
accepted evidence of present medical knowledge concerning the safety of per-
forming D&E abortions in non-hospital facilities before drafting a regulation re-
quiring that these abortions be performed before the midpoint of the second
trimester in either a hospital or a clinic, and those performed after the midpoint in
a hospital).
186. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2506 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 2507.
188. Id
189. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
190. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
191. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400-01 (1979).
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ity and what is necessary to protect the life and health of the woman
are medical judgments.
One possible resolution of this issue was examined in Ashcroft. 192
The Court held that Missouri could constitutionally require the pres-
ence of a second physician at the abortion of a viable fetus to ensure
that the interests in maternal health and potential life were accommo-
dated.'93 The state imposed a duty upon the physician to perform an
abortion of a viable fetus with the technique most likely to preserve
fetal life, unless that procedure increased the risks to maternal life or
health. Therefore, should the dissent's predictions materialize, the Roe
framework should not collapse since it has the inherent protection that
the state may proscribe abortions of viable fetuses except when neces-
sary to preserve the life or health of the woman. If the life of the wo-
man is threatened, and the abortion of a viable fetus is necessary, the
Missouri statute represents a workable solution to this ethical and
Moral problem. 94
V. CONCLUSION
The Akron decision represents a strong reaffirmation of Roe v.
Wade.195 Not only are a majority of Justices committed to the exist-
ence of a fundamental right of privacy sufficiently broad to encompass
the right to decide to terminate a pregnancy, they also agree that the
Roe trimester approach remains a valid constitutional test in light of
advances in medical technology that have resulted in the increased
safety of abortion techniques. Over the past ten years, beginning with
Roe, and most recently in Akron,196 Ashcroft, 97 and Simopoulos,198 the
192. 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
193. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. at 2522; see supra notes 116-26 and accompanying text.
194. There are other threats to the continuing viability of Roe. The five oldest Justices
joined in the Roe majority. Although abortion proponents have one of the young-
est Justices on their side (Justice Stevens), abortion opponents have increased
their Supreme Court support with the most recent appointee, Justice O'Connor.
Some observers speculate that between two and four Court vacancies will occur
by 1988. Therefore, the presidential candidate elected in 1984 may have the op-
portunity to appoint several Justices, thereby affecting the viability of Roe. Elec-
tion Also Could Determine Future Course of Supreme Court, Washington Post, July
15, 1984, at A3, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1983, at E21, col. 6; Washington Post,
Oct. 5, 1983, at A16 col. 1. In addition, Congress has acted to negate the Roe
doctrine. Abortion opponents have supported a bill that would provide that life
begins at conception, and from that moment has "legal value." S. 26, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1983). Congress has also proposed a constitutional amendment that
would declare that the right of life is the most fundamental of all rights, and that
this right vests in the "human being" from the moment of conception. S.J. Res. 8,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). Although both of these measures have failed, they
have consistently been reintroduced in an effort to eliminate the controlling effect
of the Roe decision. 129 CONG. REC. 4,225-36, 509-14 (1983).
195. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
196. 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
197. 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983).
198. 103 S. Ct. 2532 (1983).
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Supreme Court has warned the states that if they decide to regulate the
sensitive area of abortion, they must be prepared to meet an exacting
test.
City ofAkron v. Akron Centerfor Reproductive Health, Inc., ad-
hered to the Roe test and did not result in any changes in abortion law.
Contrary to the dissent's protestations, the Court did not depart from
its trimester approach announced in Roe. Instead, the Court clarified
its constitutional requirements for regulations concerning second tri-
mester abortions in light of advances in medical technology resulting in
the increased safety of abortion techniques. The state, when regulating
second trimester abortions, must consider the availability and safety of
the technique, and must allow access to safe abortion methods. The
state's compelling interest is furthered only when the regulation prohib-
its unsafe abortions during the part of the pregnancy when they are
unsafe.
These recent decisions indicate that the Roe framework is suffi-
ciently flexible to accommodate advancing medical technology that re-
sults in safer abortion techniques. This attribute, combined with the
strict standard that states must meet to justify an abortion regulation,
indicates that the Roe decision should withstand the test of time.
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